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Competitive Distortions in the 
Air Transport Markets as a Re-
sult of the Upcoming Worldwi-
de Emissions Trading Systems?
Within the next 5 to 10 years, different national and su-
pranational emissions trading schemes will be introduced 
globally to reduce aviation’s CO2 emissions: The European 
Union’s emissions trading scheme will directly limit the CO2 
emissions of virtually all flights starting from or landing at 
any European airport from 2012 onwards. The upcoming 
US cap-and-trade-system for greenhouse gases as well as 
the New Zealand system will very likely choose the fuel sup-
pliers as accountable entities of their systems (upstream 
approach): Aviation will be covered indirectly by the price im-
pact on the fuel purchased. Detailed plans for mandatory 
national emissions trading systems have also been worked out by Australia, Canada, Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland. This foreseeable heterogeneous global framework will have impacts on 
competition within the aviation sector. This paper analyses the economic and competitive impacts of 
the introduction of differently designed emissions trading systems on the international aviation sector.
Background
According to recent expert estimates, international aviation con-
tributes about 4.9 per cent to anthropogenic radiative forcing 
(Lee et al., 2009). Within the next decade, a number of emis-
sions trading schemes tackling climate change both on a national 
as well as on a supranational level is expected to be introduced. 
However, these schemes are designed rather differently from 
one another. At the moment, the plans on a European level are 
the most advanced. According to EU Directive 2008/101/EC, 
which came into force in 2009, international aviation will be 
included into the EU emissions trading scheme for the limita-
tion of CO2 emissions by 2012. Detailed plans for mandatory or 
voluntary national emissions trading systems affecting aviation 
have also been worked out by the US, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. This 
anticipated heterogeneous global framework will have effects on 
competition within the aviation sector. 
Against this backdrop, several high-level groups of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are working to 
develop a framework for market-based measures. However, at 
this point, it is not quite clear what this exactly entails. Possible 
options include a global trading scheme for aviation or guid-
ance on how to link different trading schemes in which aviation 
is included.
Upcoming National and Supranational Emissions 
Trading Systems
In the European Union, and in the Non-EU-States Norway, Ice-
land and Liechtenstein, the emissions trading scheme will cover 
virtually all flights departing from or arriving at European air-
ports. This way, both European and non-European airlines will 
participate in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). Aircraft 
operators will be obliged to hold and surrender allowances for 
CO2 emissions. EU Allowances (EUAs) as well as permits from 
the Kyoto-based “Clean Development Mechanism” (CERs) and 
“Joint Implementation” (ERUs) will be accepted for compliance. 
e-zine edition 49 
by: Janina Scheelhaase
1
The Clean Development Mechanism allows emission-reduction 
projects in developing countries to earn certified emission re-
duction (CER) credits, CERs can be traded and sold, and used 
by industrialized countries to meet a part of their targets under 
the Protocol. Joint Implementation as defined in Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, allows a country with an emission reduction or 
limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Par-
ty) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-
reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B Party. 
Both CDM and JI are understood politically as being additional 
to emission reduction measures within the European Union.
In Europe, in the year 2012, the total quantity of allowances al-
located to aircraft operators will be equivalent to 97% of the 
historical aviation emissions of the years 2004-2006 (so-called 
overall “cap”). This “cap” will be lowered by another 2% in 
2013. Allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be valid 
within the aviation sector only. However, it will be possible to 
purchase additional permits from other sectors or from the proj-
ect based Kyoto instruments “Joint Implementation” and “Clean 
Development Mechanism”. In 2012, aircraft operators may use 
emission permits from “Joint Implementation” and “Clean De-
velopment Mechanism” for up to 15% of the number of allow-
ances they are required to surrender for this year. In the period 
of 2013 until 2020, the use of these Kyoto instruments will be 
reduced to 1.5%. This figure was a political compromise agreed 
upon after long and controversial negotiations. Flights from 
third countries, which have introduced equivalent CO2 reducing 
measures can be excluded from the EU-ETS. It will be on the 
EU Commission to decide whether the third-country measures 
are equivalent. The potential for conflicts could be significant on 
this issue in the future when other trading schemes addressing 
international aviation will be in force, too.
Currently, Switzerland is negotiating with the EU Commission 
on what terms Switzerland as a non-member of the European 
Union may join the EU emissions trading scheme.
 
In the United States of America, several cap-and trade bills for 
the limitation of greenhouse gases are currently under consider-
ation. Most prominent discussed are: The American Clean En-
ergy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA) and the Clean Energy 
Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA). Common elements 
are: A mandatory cap on five Kyoto greenhouse gases plus NF3. 
The overall reduction target is a 3% reduction in 2012, a 17% re-
spectively 20 % reduction in 2020 and a 42% reduction in 2030, 
compared to 2005 levels. Accountable entities include refineries, 
electrical generators, distributors of natural gas and industrial 
facilities. Unlike the EU scheme, in which aircraft operators are 
directly affected by a cap on international aviation’s emissions 
and must surrender allowances to cover them, under both the 
ACESA and the CEJAPA, it will be the refineries that will be 
the accountable entities. Here, the refineries are expected to pass 
on the costs of compliance to the aircraft operators in the form 
of increased kerosene prices (so-called upstream approach). An 
upstream approach has the advantage of being much easier to 
handle because the number of accountable entities is signifi-
cantly smaller compared to a downstream approach. However, 
a trading scheme applying an upstream approach is not as pre-
dictable in terms of economics because it is unclear whether the 
fuel suppliers will fully pass on the cost of permits, and straight 
to the accountable entities or according to the (individual) price 
elasticities of demand (see also below). At this point in time, 
it remains to be seen whether fuel for domestic flights and for 
international flights will be treated differently within the US cap-
and-trade scheme. This is because both ACESA and CEJAPA do 
not explicitly make this distinction. 
New Zealand has introduced an emissions trading system for 
the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions in 2008. Until 2015, 
several sectors will be gradually phased in the trading scheme. 
The forestry sector started in 2008. The liquid fossil fuels sector 
as well as the stationary energy and industrial processes sectors 
have become mandatory participants by mid-2010. Other sectors 
will follow at a later point in time. Transport including domes-
tic aviation is covered indirectly by the upstream approach ex-
plained above. Fuel used for international aviation (and marine 
transport) are exempt from the scheme at the moment, consistent 
with the Kyoto Protocol. 
For the transition period (mid-2010 until December 2012), par-
ticipants of the New Zealand Scheme will only be required to 
surrender one emission permit for every two tons of emissions, 
and can purchase additional permits at a fixed price of $25 per 
unit from the Government if needed. This regulation will func-
tion as a price cap. In the scheme, both New Zealand emission 
units and Kyoto units are accepted for compliance. Currently, 
New Zealand is considering a bilateral link with the upcoming 
Australian emissions trading scheme.
In Australia, plans for the introduction of a mandatory national 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) are at an advanced 
stage. According to the draft legislation, this cap-and-trade 
scheme will cover about 75% of Australia’s total greenhouse 
gas emissions. An upstream approach will be chosen here, too. 
Domestic aviation will be included in the CPRS. For compli-
ance, Australian emissions units, CERs, ERUs and RMUs (Re-
movable Units)1 will be accepted. The bill was voted against in 
the Australian Parliament in December 2009 because of several 
reasons: On the one hand, it was feared that the CPRS would 
cost jobs, reduce Australian living standards, substantially raise 
the price of electricity and harm the Australian economy. On the 
other hand, some were afraid that the CPRS’ environmental gain 
would be too small due to its design characteristics. A revised 
bill is planned to be brought to the floor for mid-2011. 
Until the CPRS will be in force, reductions of aviation’s green-
house gas emissions can be achieved with voluntary offsetting. 
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Like many airlines worldwide, Australia’s major airlines have 
offered voluntary carbon offsetting to their passengers for both 
domestic and international flights for some years now. Since 
mid-2010, airline passengers are able to offset their carbon emis-
sions against Australian Government accredited “National Car-
bon Offset Standard”, which applies to a voluntary Australian 
carbon market. 
The Canadian Government intends to introduce a domestic 
emissions trading scheme for greenhouse gases. This scheme 
will be harmonized with that of the US. The first steps to achieve 
this goal have already been taken. The Canadian Government 
has indicated its wish for a continental approach and, ultimately, 
for a global emissions trading system.
On the level of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), the ICAO GIACC (Group on International Aviation 
and Climate Change) adopted a ‘Programme of Action’ with the 
following main goals, in May 2009: An annual improvement of 
the fuel efficiency of 2% over the medium term until 2020. For 
the long term, the GIACC recommends an aspirational global 
fuel efficiency improvement rate of 2% per annum from 2021 to 
2050. In addition, the ICAO Council should establish a process 
to develop a framework for market-based measures in interna-
tional aviation. These goals were agreed upon in the 37th ICAO 
Assembly in October 2010.
How can Emissions Trading Systems be Linked?
By linking emissions trading schemes with one another, com-
petitive distortions within the aviation sector could be avoided 
in a relatively easy way. In principle, such links can be of direct 
or indirect nature. 
A direct link would enable the accountable entities of system A 
to directly purchase and use allowances from emissions trading 
system B for compliance in emissions trading system A. In this 
case, the tradable permits of the two trading systems are fully 
equivalent for compliance. Possible sub-options are unilateral, 
full bilateral or multilateral linking. A direct link requires a for-
mal or informal agreement between the countries and/or trading 
schemes involved. 
Indirect links between emissions trading schemes do not require 
any formal or informal agreement between the systems involved. 
An indirect link will occur when emissions trading schemes 
A and B are directly linked to each other and trading between 
scheme A with another system C takes place. In this case, an in-
direct link between schemes B and C will be established. Indeed, 
a great number of the upcoming emissions trading schemes will 
be linked indirectly to each other since most of them allow for 
the use of Kyoto-project-based CERs for compliance (Schuele 
and Sterck, 2008). 
When considering linking arrangements between trading 
schemes, it will be important to assess the level of legal com-
mitment of the schemes (mandatory versus voluntary schemes), 
the overall reduction targets, the covered greenhouse gases, the 
type of emissions permits accepted for compliance and their per-
ceived quality, the method of initial allocation of permits, the 
penalties for non-compliance, and the possibilities to harmonize 
special provisions such as a price cap, among other issues.
The potential benefits of linking two or more emissions trading 
schemes include:
ñ Overall lower costs of compliance due to a greater diver-
sity of emission sources and the inclusion of more abatement 
options. This leads to a higher economic efficiency of both (or 
more) linked trading schemes.
ñ Higher liquidity of the emissions trading markets because of 
increased demand and supply. The risks of ‘thin markets’ will be 
significantly lower in linked systems.
ñ Competitive disadvantages for sectors that operate interna-
tionally to a considerable degree, such as aviation, can be avoid-
ed as much as possible.
However, there are potential risks and obstacles related to link-
ing trading systems as well:
ñ Higher total emissions or unintended double-charging of 
emissions if the provisions for regulating emissions are not 
clearly defined. Also, leakages could occur. Leakage is the in-
direct effect of emission reduction policies or activities in the 
trading scheme(s) under consideration, which leads to a rise in 
emissions elsewhere. These risks are directly related to the ques-
tion of how to ensure uniformity in terms of reduction targets, 
geographical coverage, covered gases, monitoring requirements, 
penalties for non-compliance, etc. between the linked schemes. 
If uniformity cannot be achieved, it may result in the effective 
application of the least or, in some cases, the most stringent 
regulations. Ultimately, the ecological effectiveness of both 
(or more) systems under consideration could be endangered. 
ñ Different policy initiatives in the countries with linked emis-
sion trading schemes may also bear risks. This is especially true 
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for schemes applying an upstream approach: Assuming a policy 
initiative is implemented in a country to promote natural gas in 
the heating market. This will lead to a drop in demand for heat-
ing oil, among other reactions. The fuel suppliers could react to 
this different demand situation by decreasing the price of heat-
ing oil and increase the price for another product, say kerosene, 
for instance. This strategy is likely if the elasticities of demand 
are appropriate. In this situation, the accountable entities of the 
country under consideration will encounter higher kerosene 
prices than in other countries. Kerosene price hedging can ease 
this risk, but economic uncertainties will remain for the airlines.
ñ Changing currency exchange rates may also negatively af-
fect the uniformity of the linked trading schemes.
ñ Uneven price caps in the linked schemes or price interfer-
ence in one of the trading schemes will lead to emission markets 
distortions in both linked systems. In general, the introduction 
of price caps or price interferences by the government/trading 
authority have to be considered very thoroughly, because these 
measures could induce a malfunctioning of the emissions trad-
ing markets as such.
ñ Increased administrative burdens for trading schemes’ par-
ticipants. The necessity to harmonize regulations could lead to 
very complex rules for trading, monitoring and verification. 
A great number of these risks and obstacles can be avoided by 
a very thorough harmonization of the provisions of the trading 
schemes under consideration, at least if the possibility of link-
ing is considered at an early stage of the design of the trading 
schemes. 
Economic and Competitive Impacts on International 
Aviation
If the different emissions trading schemes can be successfully 
linked, and if many regions important for international aviation 
will be covered by the linked schemes, relatively equalized costs 
of compliance within the aviation sector will be induced. A given 
emissions reduction target can then be realized with overall low 
abatement costs. This will result in relatively similar competitive 
conditions in the markets under consideration. Under these con-
ditions, economic and competitive distortions can be avoided. 
But linking cap-and-trade-schemes with fundamentally different 
approaches can be technically complex:
ñ Firstly, linking upstream trading systems as favored by the 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand with the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme applying a downstream approach can 
be difficult: While the CO2 reduction target imposed on the par-
ticipating airlines in the EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
(and perhaps Switzerland) will be relatively easy to calculate, 
this could be much more complex in trading systems covering 
aviation indirectly by the price 
impact on the fuel purchased. 
ñ Secondly, the participants 
of both systems are incentiv-
ized in a different way with 
the European approach pro-
viding a direct incentive for 
the airlines either to reduce 
CO2 emissions or to purchase 
allowances. Instead, the US/
Canada/New Zealand/Austra-
lian approach will be providing 
a direct incentive to the refin-
eries, and the airlines will be incentivized indirectly by higher 
fuel prices. As mentioned above, here it is unclear whether the 
refineries will be passing through the costs of compliance fully 
and straight to the airlines or according to the price elasticities 
of demand. 
ñ Thirdly, the same is true for the proposed distribution of 
reduction targets within the considered timeframe. While the 
reduction activities within the European system will predomi-
nantly take place in the short and medium term, and therefore 
will require significant and costly abatement measures relatively 
soon, the possible North American trading system – as it is fore-
seeable from today’s point of view - seems to emphasize its re-
duction activities in the years 2020 – 2030 due to general energy 
economic goals.
ñ Finally, linking mandatory trading schemes like the EU ETS 
and the proposed North American Schemes with a voluntary 
system as applied in Australia for some time now could harm 
the environmental integrity of the mandatory trading systems. 
Moreover, competitive distortions could arise due to the dif-
ferent treatment of aviation’s emissions in the systems under 
consideration.
In essence, linking the EU ETS with the upcoming trading 
schemes in the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, in the 
way they are taking shape now, seems to be difficult in terms 
of achieving uniformity. If successfully linking turns out to be 
impossible, competitive disadvantages for airlines originating 
from the country/the group of countries with the more stringent 
scheme are likely to occur. This will be especially true for net-
work carriers competing on markets for long-haul air services. In 
this case, considerable competitive disadvantages may result as 
Scheelhaase et al. (2010) and Schaefer et al. (2010) have shown. 
Modeling the economic and competitive impacts of the different 
upcoming trading schemes would require reliable and detailed 
information on the design of the trading schemes in North-
America and Australia. This kind of information does not exist 
to date. Just for illustrative purposes, the following table shows 
estimations of the economic impact of the EU ETS for selected 
EU- and non-EU network carriers. The table reveals that, even 
though both kind of carriers are included in the EU ETS, sig-
nificant differences arise due to the fact that EU network car-
riers fully operate under the EU ETS (with some exceptions) 
while only the non-EU network carriers’ long haul services to 
and from Europe are subject to the EU ETS.
Unsuccessful linking of different trading schemes may even in-
duce greater economic effects. This is because network carriers 
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 10 largest EU net-work carriers
10 largest non-EU 
network carriers
Free allocation of EU-allowances in Mt 60.8 24.0
Forecasted CO2-emissions in Mt 93.0 31.8
Percentage of free allocation 65.4 75.6
EU allowances to be acquired in Mt 32.2 7.8
Acquisition cost for additional allowances (25 € per allo-
wance) in million € 805.3 193.9
Acquisition cost for additional allowances (40 € per allo-
wance) in million € 1288.5 310.2
Table 1: Comparison of initial allocation, forecasted emissions and acquisition costs for different airline 
groups in 2012. Source: Schaefer et al. (2010).
originating from the more stringent trading scheme are likely to 
encounter two systematic competitive disadvantages compared 
to airlines under the less stringent scheme: Firstly, given the same 
origin/destination city pair, network carriers originating from the 
more stringent scheme will in most cases fly a longer distance 
under this scheme than their third-country counterparts. Second-
ly, at least a part of the total distance will be covered with en-
vironmentally relatively inefficient short-distance feeder flights 
subject to the more stringent scheme. Network carriers originat-
ing from the less stringent scheme, however, operate their short-
distance feeder flights with relatively high specific emissions 
outside the scope of the more stringent trading scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have indicated the necessity as well as the rath-
er great difficulties associated with linking the upcoming trad-
ing schemes for the reduction of greenhouse gases. At least from 
today’s point of view, unsuccessful linking is a likely option. 
This will have negative economic implications for the aviation 
sector because many airlines operate on a largely global scale 
and, on many routes, compete worldwide. Under these condi-
tions, competitive disadvantages for airlines originating from 
the country/the group of countries with the more stringent cap-
and-trade scheme are a viable option. Network carriers com-
peting on markets for long-haul air services in particular will 
encounter these disadvantages.
Overall, international aviation may face a heterogeneous and 
rather difficult political environment in the foreseeable future. 
An unfavorable ‘patchwork’ of different cap-and-trade schemes 
seems to be a likely outcome. Strategic options for ICAO Con-
tracting States, airlines and other stakeholders are in this respect:
ñ To actively promote and support ICAO’s goal to develop 
a framework for market-based measures, especially rules or 
guidance how to design or link emissions trading schemes for 
the limitation of greenhouse gases from international aviation. 
Given the urgent need to address climate change, a much more 
ambitious approach, including a robust cap on international 
aviation’s emissions seems to be necessary from an ecological 
point of view.
ñ To develop and implement a basket of climate-friendly mea-
sures for international aviation on a voluntary basis, which lead 
to ambitious greenhouse gas reductions as a complementary 
strategy. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has 
already conducted first steps in this respect by committing to 
carbon neutral growth in the year 2020. Currently, tests are being 
conducted on the commercial use of biofuels for aviation.
It will be on the Contracting States, the airlines and other impor-
tant stakeholders to make noticeable progress towards a homog-
enous political environment for aviation.
Notes
1 RMUs are tradable units issued by the UNFCCC to an Annex B Party 
for specified sequestration activities during the Kyoto Protocol commit-
ment period (2008-2012).
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Photo: Airplane condensation trails (contrails) across the English 
Channel. Courtesy by NASA
